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An important criticism of race-based higher education admission preferences is that they may hurt
minority students who attend more selective schools than they would in the absence of such preferences.
We categorize the non-experimental research designs available for the study of so-called "mismatch"
effects and evaluate the likely biases in each.  We select two comparisons and use them to examine
mismatch effects in law school.  We find no evidence of mismatch effects on any students' employment
outcomes or on the graduation or bar passage rates of black students with moderate or strong entering
credentials.  What evidence there is for mismatch comes from less-qualified black students who typically
attend second- or third-tier schools.  Many of these students would not have been admitted to any law
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    Critics have long argued that the use of affirmative action in college and graduate 
school admissions harms students from underrepresented groups who are the apparent 
beneficiaries of admission preferences.  These critics claim that students who do not 
qualify for ordinary admission are in fact inadequately prepared, and would do better—
learn more and be more likely to graduate—if they were admitted only to schools better 
matched to their qualifications (Summers, 1970; Thernstrom and Thernstrom, 1997).
1 
Sowell (1978, p. 41), for example, writes that when “Ivy League schools and the leading 
state and private institutions” use affirmative action, “[t]he net result is that thousands of 
minority students who would normally qualify for good, non-prestigious colleges where 
they could succeed are instead enrolled at famous institutions where they fail.” 
Much of the recent debate about what is known as “the mismatch hypothesis” has 
focused on law schools.  Sander (2004, 2005a,b) finds that large mismatch effects result 
from affirmative action preferences for black applicants, but subsequent authors, using 
the same data but different estimation strategies, find no evidence of mismatch (see, e.g., 
Ayres and Brooks, 2005; Ho, 2005; Chambers, et al, 2005; Barnes, 2007).   
In this paper, we use simple, reduced-form strategies to re-examine the evidence 
regarding mismatch in law school.  We find that the data are more informative than the 
literature to date would suggest.  What evidence there is for mismatch comes from the 
least qualified law students.  Identification of mismatch effects is particularly difficult for 
                                                 
1 The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that affirmative action’s relevant benefits are through 
diversity of the educational environment, suggesting that effects on white students’ outcomes are the most 
important.  See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003).  Another important effect is on the white students who are displaced from selective 
schools by less-qualified minority applicants.  Neither of these is our focus here.  See Holzer and Neumark 
(2000) for a review of relevant literatures. 
 1  these students; in any event, they are unlikely to be admitted to the most selective law 
schools even with preferences.  When we focus on students in the top four quintiles of the 
entering credentials distribution, we find no evidence for mismatch effects.  Even 
methods that we would expect to overstate mismatch indicate that affirmative action 
benefits rather than harms black students. 
We begin by developing a framework for classifying the empirical strategies used 
in the literature to date. Three contrasts have been used:  between students of the same 
race and same (observable) admission credentials who attend more- and less-selective 
schools; between black and white students with the same credentials who, because of 
affirmative action, typically attend different schools; and between students at the same 
school who differ in their law school grades.  
Each of these contrasts is likely to yield a biased estimate of the mismatch effect – 
the effect of attending a highly selective school rather than one that is less selective – 
though the form and magnitude of this bias varies.  To sign the likely biases, we consider 
a simple data generating process, incorporating both observed student credentials and 
other qualifications considered in admissions but unobserved by the econometrician.  The 
first contrast can be expected to understate the mismatch effect, while the second and 
especially the third will likely overstate it. As Sander (2004) relies heavily on the third 
contrast (while invoking the second), and his critics unanimously rely on the first, the 
predictable biases can explain the divergent pattern of results seen in the literature. 
We next select the two strategies – “selective-unselective” and “black-white” 
comparisons – that we expect to be the most informative, and we implement simple, 
reduced-form versions of each.  Our illustrative data generating process indicates that 
 2  under reasonable assumptions these will bracket the true effects of mismatch on law 
school graduation and bar exam passage.
2  While the selective-unselective comparison 
has been widely used, the black-white comparison is new to the law school literature.
3  
Consistent with earlier work, we find that students attending highly selective 
schools have better academic and labor market outcomes than equally qualified students 
attending less selective schools, the opposite sign from that predicted by the mismatch 
hypothesis.  By contrast, black students have lower graduation and bar passage rates 
(although better employment outcomes) than whites with the same admission credentials.  
While this result appears consistent with the mismatch hypothesis, further investigation 
suggests a more nuanced view. The black-white gap is driven entirely by students whose 
admission credentials place them in the bottom quintile of the law student population, 
few of whom attend highly selective law schools. Among more qualified students, blacks 
graduate and pass the bar exam at similar rates to otherwise similar whites.  Moreover, 
for the least-qualified law students, black-white comparisons are subject to an important 
sample selection bias, deriving from the frequency with which poorly qualified applicants 
are rejected by even the least selective law schools.  As a consequence, results based on 
the bottom quintile cannot support strong inferences about mismatch.  We therefore 
conclude that the available data provide little evidence regarding mismatch effects on the 
least qualified students and strongly suggest that mismatch effects are absent for students 
with moderate or better qualifications. 
We emphasize, however, that all of the evidence regarding the mismatch 
hypothesis derives from observational analyses.  Our conclusions rest on unverifiable 
                                                 
2 We also consider employment outcomes, for which our estimates may not bracket the true effect. 
3 Bowen and Bok (1998) present estimates of this form for undergraduate admissions. 
 3  assumptions about the signs of the biases in the comparisons we examine.  Because all 
black students in the last several decades have had access to admission preferences, more 
robust strategies are unavailable.  Research and policy must therefore proceed on the 
basis of the sort of assumptions – strong, but explicit – that we rely on here. 
The paper proceeds as follows:  Section II develops our typology of strategies for 
identifying the effects of school selectivity.  Section III presents a simple statistical model 
illustrating the likely biases in the various strategies.  In Section IV, we describe the Bar 
Passage Study (BPS) data that we use for our analysis.  Section V presents estimates of 
the role of affirmative action in law school admissions.  We present empirical result from 
our two comparisons in Section VI.  Section VII concludes. 
II. A Typology of Identification Strategies for the Selective School Effect 
The mismatch hypothesis is a claim about the effect of attending a selective 
school, relative to one that is less selective.  If selective schools have negative effects on 
students who are admitted only because of the availability of admission preferences, then 
the elimination of such preferences would raise these students’ outcomes.
4
The strategies that have been used to isolate the effects of selectivity from those 
of other potentially confounding variables, particularly the academic credentials that 
determine admission to selective schools, can be classified into three broad categories. 
The first is a simple comparison between students attending more- and less-
selective schools, controlling for differences in observed credentials.  Kane (1998) and 
                                                 
4 There are also plausible claims (see, e.g., D’Souza, 1991, and Steele, 1990) that the existence of 
affirmative action harms black students who would be admitted to selective schools even without 
preferences by promoting the view that black students are unprepared.  On the other hand, if black students 
are positively affected by the presence of black classmates (as “critical mass” arguments would imply), 
preferences might help these highly qualified black students.  We focus on the partial equilibrium effects of 
selectivity on individual students, holding other students’ schools fixed.   
 4  Bowen and Bok (1998) use this type of comparison to examine the effects of attending a 
selective college, while Chambers et al. (2005), Ho (2005), Ayres and Brooks (2005), and 
Barnes (2007) use versions of the selective-unselective comparison for law students.  
None of these studies finds large negative effects of school selectivity. 
Selective-unselective comparisons identify the effect of attending a selective 
school only if the type of school attended is random, conditional on the included control 
variables.  This is unlikely if admission to selective schools depends on variables that are 
not controlled in the statistical analysis.  Accordingly, each of the above analyses controls 
for students’ observed admission credentials, particularly scores on standardized entrance 
tests.  But this may be insufficient:  Admission decisions reflect other factors – e.g., 
letters of recommendation, personal statements, unusual academic and non-academic 
experiences – that are unobserved by the econometrician and therefore cannot be 
controlled.
5  If these factors are predictive of later outcomes conditional on observed 
credentials, the selective-unselective comparison will be biased. 
A variant of the selective-unselective comparison focuses on the matriculation 
decisions of students admitted to several schools, using actual admission decisions to 
control for both observed and unobserved credentials.  Dale and Krueger (2002) compare 
students attending highly selective colleges with others admitted to these schools but 
enrolled elsewhere.  This eliminates endogeneity due to admission decisions, as the 
treatment and comparison students are, by construction, equally admissible.  It identifies 
the selectivity effect provided that students’ post-admission matriculation decisions are 
uncorrelated with other determinants – e.g., ambition – of future outcomes.  Dale and 
                                                 
5 Ho (2005) matches on a long list of student background characteristics.  Even his list cannot 
include the unmeasured, non-quantitative admissions credentials that are the most likely source of bias. 
 5  Krueger find no effect of school selectivity on average, but find that the effect is positive 
for low-income students.  
Ayres and Brooks (2005) and Sander (2005b) attempt to approximate the Dale 
and Krueger strategy by comparing law students who report attending their first choice 
schools with those who say that they are attending their second choices because their first 
choices were too expensive or too far from home.  There is no reason to think, however, 
that the latter group was – or could have been – admitted to the schools attended by the 
former group.  As a consequence, the “second choice” estimates are likely subject to the 
same biases as are selective-unselective comparisons.  
A second strategy for identifying the effect of selectivity relies on comparisons of 
black and white students with similar observed credentials.  This strategy attempts to 
isolate exogenous variation by leveraging admission preferences for black students who, 
because of their preferential treatment, have access to more selective schools than do 
whites with similar entering credentials.
6  Use of this variation to identify selectivity 
effects requires school selectivity to be the only source of differences between average 
black and white outcomes, conditional on observed credentials.  Any uncontrolled factors 
leading to differences in outcomes will confound the selectivity effect.  
Sander’s (2004) original study combines the black-white comparison with both 
selective-unselective comparisons and contrasts between students with better and worse 
grades at the same schools.  He uses a black-white comparison to estimate a negative 
effect of selectivity on law school grades.  He then includes both selectivity and grades in 
equations for graduation and bar passage.  Both selectivity and grades have positive 
                                                 
6 We present some evidence on this below. See also Sander (2004) and Rothstein and Yoon (2008) 
for law school and Bowen and Bok (1998) and Krueger et al. (2006) for undergraduate admissions. 
 6  coefficients, the latter much larger than the former.  This leads Sander to conclude that, 
on net, preferences depress black outcomes, as the large negative effect operating through 
law school grades swamps the positive effect operating through selectivity. 
As Ho (2005) emphasizes, Sander’s inclusion of law school grades, an 
intermediate outcome, in his final equation makes his analysis fundamentally different 
from the selective-unselective comparison previously discussed.  Identification of the 
causal effect of grades requires that the unobserved determinants of law school grades 
and later outcomes are completely uncorrelated.  Unmeasured academic ability is an 
obvious omitted variable.  High ability students most likely earn higher grades and better 
long-term outcomes than low ability students, even conditional on entering credentials.  
As a result, Sander’s analysis can be expected to substantially overstate the mismatch 
effect. 
While this is an important drawback, Sander’s essential logic, that the mismatch 
hypothesis implies that “blacks have much higher failure rates on the bar than do whites 
with similar LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs” (Sander, 2004, p. 373), is sound.  
This claim can be evaluated via simple, reduced-form black-white comparisons.  One 
important advantage of the reduced-form strategy is that the required assumptions are 
transparent and much weaker than those needed for Sander’s structured approach.  
Nevertheless, they too may be violated; we discuss the likely consequences of this in the 
next section.  A second advantage is that the black-white comparison does not require a 
selectivity measure.  The law school data contain only a crude proxy for school 
selectivity, seriously limiting selective-unselective comparisons.  
 7  III. A Simple Statistical Model 
To fix ideas, we consider a simple model relating law school outcomes to entering 
credentials, race, and the selectivity of the school attended.  Let yi be the outcome for 
student i, generated by: 
(1) yi = α + Xi βX + Zi βZ + bi γ + si θ + εi. 
7
Here, Xi and Zi are the student credentials that are considered by a selective school’s 
admission office.  X is also observed by the econometrician, but Z is not.  bi is an 
indicator variable for being black.  βX, βZ, and γ are projection coefficients, capturing the 
predictive power of credentials and race for student outcomes rather than the causal 
effects.  In particular, γ captures both the direct effect of student race on outcomes and 
any systematic difference in unobserved (by the admission office) credentials between 
black and white students.  si is a measure of school selectivity, with higher values 
corresponding to more selective schools.  θ is the causal effect of attending a selective 
school, relative to a less selective school, on student outcomes.   
ε is an error term, encompassing the portion of student ability that is not observed 
in admissions as well as any post-admissions shocks to student outcomes.  By 
construction, ε is orthogonal to X, Z, and b in the population of law school applicants and 
is uncorrelated with the admission decisions of selective schools.  However, students’ 
decisions to accept or decline admission offers at selective schools may be endogenous.  
This may produce a correlation between ε and s, conditional on the other variables.   
As written, (1) assumes that θ is constant across students.  A realistic version of 
the mismatch hypothesis requires heterogeneity in the effect of selective schools, which 
                                                 
7 As written, we assume that outcomes are linear in the predictor variables.  In our empirical 
analysis, we use probit models for binary outcomes; y can be seen as the underlying latent variable. 
 8  might have positive effects on well-prepared (high X and Z) students but negative effects 
on underprepared students.  We return to the potential heterogeneity of θ below. 
A.    Selective-unselective comparisons  
Using (1), the difference between the mean outcomes of students attending 
selective and unselective schools conditional on race and observed credentials is: 
(2)   Ds(b, X)   ≡ E[y | b, X, s = 1] – E[y | b, X, s = 0] 
   =   θ + E[ZβZ | b, X, s = 1] – E[ZβZ | b, X, s = 0] 
                                          + E[γ | b, X, s = 1] – E[γ | b, X, s = 0]. 
θ is the selectivity effect.  The remaining terms represent potential biases.   
The first bias term, E[ZβZ | b, X, s = 1] – E[ZβZ | b, X, s = 0], derives from the 
role of unobserved credentials in determining admission to selective schools.
8  Holding X 
and b constant, the probability of admission to a selective school is increasing in ZβZ.  
This creates a positive partial correlation between s and ZβZ, biasing Ds(b, X) upward.   
The second bias term, E[ε | b, X, s = 1] – E[ε | b, X, s = 0], derives from the 
matriculation decisions of students admitted to selective schools.  If students with high 
unobserved (to the admission office) ability are more likely to take up offers of admission 
at selective schools, this bias is positive as well.   
Thus, we expect that the total bias in Ds(b, X) is positive.  Analyses that exploit 
cross-sectional variation in selectivity without isolating an exogenous component are 
likely to overstate the selectivity effect.  A similar bias applies to tests based on ∂Ds(b, 
                                                 
8 This term could also reflect matriculation decisions, if correlated with Z conditional on X. 
 9  X)/ ∂X), as in Barnes (2007).  There is every reason to expect that the bias terms in (2) 
will vary with X, providing evidence of mismatch even if θ is identically 0.
9  
Dale and Krueger’s (2002) comparison of students attending selective schools 
with students who declined admission to those schools (discussed above) plausibly 
eliminates the first bias term in (2).  The second bias term may remain, as Dale and 
Krueger note, if matriculation decisions are correlated with unobserved ability. 
Unfortunately, in the available data it is impossible to know whether students at 
less selective schools who do not attend their first choice schools for reasons of cost or 
distance – the comparison group for selective school students in the second-choice 
analyses of Ayres and Brooks (2005) and Sander (2005b) – were in fact admitted to 
selective schools.  If they were not, the first bias term in (2) persists in the second-choice 
comparison. There is also reason to expect the second bias term in (2) to be important in 
this comparison.  Students in the second-choice sample are systematically poorer than 
those in the first-choice sample and have less-educated parents—both factors that may be 
correlated with ε.   
B.  Between-race comparisons 
Black students, by virtue of their access to affirmative action preferences, are 
admitted to more selective schools than are white students with otherwise identical 
admission credentials.  If school selectivity is harmful, this should be apparent in the 
reduced-form black-white gap in outcomes conditional on observed credentials: 
(3)   Db(X)  ≡ E[y | b = 1, X] – E[y | b = 0, X] 
  =   θ (E[s | b=1, X] – E[s | b = 0, X]) 
                                                 
9 If X and Z are bivariate normal, for example the first bias term will contain the expression 
λ(a+cX) + λ(-a-cX), where a and c are constants and λ() is the inverse Mills ratio.  This varies with X. 
 10     +   E [ Z βZ | b = 1, X] – E[ZβZ | b = 0, X] + γ.  
The first term in (3) is the selectivity effect of interest, θ, multiplied by the difference in 
average selectivity between black and white students conditional on X.  The availability 
of admission preferences for black students ensures that this is positive, and indeed we 
demonstrate below that it is substantial.  Ignoring the remaining terms for the moment, 
evidence that Db(X) < 0 can therefore be taken as support for the mismatch hypothesis.  
Equation (3) shows two biases that might confound the test.  These biases are 
different than those in the selective-unselective comparison and likely work in the 
opposite direction.  The first, E[ZβZ | b = 1, X] – E[ZβZ | b = 0, X], reflects differences in 
unobserved (to the econometrician) admission qualifications between black and white 
students.  This is almost certainly negative—average LSAT scores are lower among 
black students than among white students with the same college GPAs (and vice versa), 
and it stands to reason that average unobserved admission credentials are lower among 
blacks than whites conditional on observables. 
The final term in (3), γ, is the predictive effect of student race within schools, 
combining the causal effect of race and any difference in unobserved (by the admission 
office) preparedness between black and white students.  The latter is likely negative, by 
the previous argument.  The sign of the causal effect probably depends on the outcome 
measure used.
10  When y is an employment outcome, the use of affirmative action in 
hiring plausibly produces a positive γ.  When y is an academic outcome, however, 
explicit and implicit discrimination seem likely to have negative effects (Dauber, 2005).   
                                                 
10 To be clear, we do not attempt to estimate the causal effect of race.  Because race is not subject 
to manipulation, its causal effect cannot be identified (and is arguably not even well defined; see Holland, 
1986).  This does not prevent the black-white comparison from being informative about the causal effect of 
interest, θ, though subject to other potentially confounding influences. 
 11  Combining the two confounding factors, the net bias in Db(X) is likely negative 
for academic outcomes.  This conclusion is supported by research on the prediction of 
college grades (e.g. Rothstein, 2004; Young, 2001), which generally indicates that white 
college students outperform black students with the same observed admission credentials 
at the same colleges.  Similar pattern have been found in law schools (Wightman, 2000; 
Wightman and Muller, 1990; Anthony and Liu, 2003; and Powers, 1977).  The net bias in 
analyses of employment outcomes is more difficult to sign, and could plausibly be either 
positive or negative.   
An additional bias in the black-white comparison is not captured by (3).  Even the 
least selective law schools reject many applicants and many poorly qualified would-be 
law students are not admitted anywhere.  This is much more common for whites than for 
similarly-credentialed blacks.  Thus, even if Z is balanced across races conditional on X 
among applicants, the admission process truncates the Z distribution, more so for whites 
than for blacks.
11  Black-white comparisons based only on matriculants will find larger 
gaps – and therefore more apparent evidence for mismatch – than would be observed if 
outcomes were measured for the full population of applicants.  This bias will be 
concentrated at X values where non-admission probabilities are relatively high. 
C.  Heterogeneous effects of school selectivity 
In equation (1), the effect of attending a selective school is constant.  This permits 
only a simplistic version of the mismatch hypothesis, θ < 0.  A more realistic assumption 
is that the selectivity effect is heterogeneous.  The mismatch hypothesis is then the claim 
                                                 
11 Specifically, assume that a student is admitted to some law school only if Xi δX + Zi δZ > c(bi), 
where δX, δZ > 0 and c(bi) is a race-specific constant with c(0) > c(1).  Then E[ Z | X, b, admitted to some 
school] = E[Z | Z > δZ
-1(c(b) – X δX)].  If corr(X, Z) > 0, this is decreasing in b, particularly at X values for 
which the admission constraint is most binding. 
 12  that θi  is negative, on average, for students admitted to selective schools only via 
affirmative action preferences.   
This does not fundamentally alter the analysis.  With heterogeneous treatment 
effects, θ is replaced in (2) with the mean of θi among students attending selective 
schools.  The logic of mismatch implies that this should be larger than the average effect 
in the population of affirmative action beneficiaries, producing yet another upward bias 
on selective-unselective comparisons.  Equation (3) is more complex.  In an earlier 
version of this paper (Rothstein and Yoon, 2007), we showed that (3) can be seen as the 
reduced form for an instrumental estimator in which bi is used as an instrument for si.  
This implies that the relevant mean in (3) is the local average of θi among black students 
attending selective schools who would have attended unselective schools had they been 
admitted as white students.  These students are precisely the population of interest for the 
mismatch hypothesis; if it holds, the first term of (3) should be negative. 
IV. Data 
The data set used for all studies to date examining mismatch in law school is the 
Law School Admission Council’s (LSAC) Bar Passage Study (BPS; Wightman 1998, 
1999), a census of students matriculating at accredited law schools in fall 1991. The BPS 
contains information on over 27,000 students, about 62 percent of the 1991 cohort.
12  
Variables include LSAT scores, college GPAs, and measures of law school performance 
and bar exam outcomes. A subsample was chosen to receive a follow-up survey about 
employment outcomes four to six months after graduation.  
                                                 
12 Most non-response was individual:  163 of 172 accredited law schools participated in the study.  
Entering questionnaire response rates for blacks and whites were 59% and 62%, respectively.  We have 
found no indication that non-response differs systematically by entering credentials. 
 13  Summary statistics are reported in the first two columns of Table 1.  We focus on 
the 24,049 black and white students with valid data on entering credentials, of whom 7.6 
percent are black. We present means by race in Columns 3 and 4, and by race and 
selectivity (as defined below) in Columns 5 – 8.   
Our two X variables are the LSAT score and the undergraduate grade point 
average (UGPA).  LSAT scores range from 10 to 48, with mean 36.8 and standard 
deviation 5.5.  The UGPA, computed from student transcripts, ranges from 1.5 to 4.0, 
with an A grade corresponding to a 4.0, a B to a 3.0, etc.  For graphical analyses, we form 
an index, using weights of 0.4 and 0.6 on the standardized UGPA and LSAT, 
respectively,
13 then convert this index to a percentile score based on the distribution 
within our sample.  The black-white gaps in LSAT scores and UGPAs in our sample are -
1.59 and -0.96 standard deviations, respectively, while the gap in index percentiles is -40 
(corresponding to a gap of -1.69 standard deviations in the index itself).  Figure 1 
displays the cumulative distribution of percentile scores among black and white students.  
For confidentiality reasons, the BPS groups law schools into six “clusters” based 
on size, cost, selectivity, tuition level, and minority representation.  We focus on a 
dichotomous categorization, treating the “Elite” and “Public Ivy” (Wightman 1993) 
clusters as highly selective (s=1) and the remaining clusters – which overlap substantially 
in the credentials of their students and have relatively similar admission rates, so provide 
little information about school selectivity – as less selective (s=0).
14  24% of BPS 
students attend highly selective schools.  Within each race, students at the most selective 
                                                 
13 These weights are taken from Sander (2004).  They are nearly identical to the weights that best 
predict attendance at a highly selective school, as defined below.   
14 We have also conducted our selective-unselective comparisons across all six clusters, with 
similar results to those presented below.  
 14  schools have much better credentials than students at less selective schools, but the 
between-race difference in the probability of attending a highly selective school is small. 
We consider several categories of outcomes.  First, we examine performance 
during the first year of law school, when curricula are typically standardized and grades 
are issued on strict curves.  First year grades are important determinants of access to 
prestigious internships and post-graduation clerkships.  The BPS grades measure is 
standardized within law schools.  We view it as a purely relative measure, and convert it 
to class rank (ranging from 0 at the bottom to 1 at the top) under the assumption that 
GPAs are normally distributed within each school.  The average black student is at the 
23
rd percentile of his or her class and the average white student is at the 54
th percentile.   
Our second group of student outcome measures has to do with law school 
graduation and bar exam success.  We form a simple indicator for graduation; the BPS 
permits us to track ultimate graduation even for the few students who transfer schools.  
Bar passage is somewhat more complex, as some graduates – those who do not plan to 
practice law – never sit for the exam.  We focus on a measure that excludes non-takers.
15  
Our final category of outcome measures concerns post-law school labor market 
experiences.  Few non-graduates responded to the BPS follow-up survey, so we restrict 
our attention to graduates.  We construct three measures: an indicator for full time 
employment; an indicator for job quality; and the log annual salary.  Our job quality 
measure is based on a subjective classification of jobs into prestigious – clerkships, 
professorships, large law firms, etc. – and non-prestigious groups.  For the job quality and 
                                                 
15 We count students who did not graduate from law school as failures.  A back-of-the-envelope 
calculation suggests that about 3% of the graduates that we exclude as non-takers in fact failed the exam in 
one of the 14 states that do not report failed attempts.  We discuss below several alternative measures that 
vary in their treatment of non-takers.  Our results are consistent across measures.  
 15  salary measures, we restrict attention to respondents with full-time jobs.  The sample size 
for the employment analyses is 3,144, of whom two-thirds had full-time jobs.   
Each of the outcome measures has advantages and disadvantages for our 
purposes.  Academic performance within school is most directly tied to mismatch, as a 
student who struggles to keep up with his or her classmates will earn poorer grades.  On 
the other hand, class rank may reflect mechanical effects of selectivity: the same absolute 
performance will produce a lower rank at a more selective school simply because the 
competition is stiffer.  We therefore interpret our class rank analyses as primarily 
measuring the degree to which students are mismatched relative to their classmates, 
rather than the effects of mismatch.  Graduation is a much more absolute measure, though 
the threshold may vary somewhat across schools.  
Bar exams use blind graded and are administered by state bar associations, so in 
principle there should be no effects of race or of school quality other than those operating 
through student achievement.  However, students choose where to take the exam and the 
state-specific component of the exam varies in difficulty.  The BPS does not report the 
state where the student took the exam.
16  We expect that selective school students are 
more likely to take the exam in states with reputations for more difficult exams (e.g. 
California and New York), which also tend to have larger, more prestigious legal labor 
markets.  If so, selective-unselective comparisons will overstate mismatch effects on bar 
passage.  It is difficult to sign the effect of endogenous state selection on the black-white 
comparison, although we expect that any such effect is small. 
                                                 
16 The BPS does report the region in which the exam was taken, though this is a poor proxy for 
difficulty.  Our results are not sensitive to controlling for this.  
 16  The most important drawback to our employment outcomes is that they may not 
be race-blind measures of academic success if employers prefer black job applicants or 
applicants from elite schools.  These will bias both of our comparisons against the 
mismatch hypothesis.
17  Thus, while we expect the black-white comparison to overstate 
mismatch effects on graduation and bar passage, this expectation may not hold for 
employment outcomes. 
V.  Measuring Preferences & Mismatch 
Figure 3 displays the fractions of white and black students in the BPS sample who 
attend schools in the two highly selective clusters, as functions of the admission index 
percentile.  These are computed from locally linear regressions; dashed lines show 
pointwise 90% confidence intervals.  Throughout the index distribution, black students 
are much more likely to attend highly selective schools than white students.
18   
The first two columns of Table 2 show probit models for attendance at a highly 
selective school. The main table shows coefficients; the bottom row shows the implied 
effect of being black on the probability of attending a highly-selective school, averaged 
over the covariate variable distribution for black students in the sample.  Column 1 
includes quadratic controls for LSAT scores and UGPAs, as well as a linear interaction.  
The black coefficient is large and positive, indicating that blacks are, on average, 16 
                                                 
17 It is not clear that preferences in employment should be discounted entirely.  If law firms are 
competitive profit-maximizers, a black salary premium would indicate that black lawyers have higher 
marginal revenue products.  A school that hopes to maximize its graduates’ productivity should then cater 
to firm preferences by itself practicing affirmative action.  The black-white gap in employment outcomes 
can be interpreted as a measure of the combined effect of admissions and hiring preferences.   
18 The curves in Figure 3 are flattened by the heterogeneity of selectivity within our “highly 
selective” category.  Sander (2004, Figure 2.8) shows that the probability of admission to the University of 
Michigan Law School is nearly a step function in the admissions index, with approximately the same 
leftward shift in the curve for blacks that is seen in Figure 3.  This suggests that the lowest-credentialed 
black and white students in the highly selective BPS clusters probably attend the least selective schools in 
these clusters.  
 17  percentage points more likely to attend highly selective schools than whites with similar 
credentials.  This effect is robust to the inclusion of controls for 15 variables measured at 
law school entrance, including work experience and several family background measures 
(Column 2) and for higher-order terms in the observed credentials (not shown). 
There are no completely unselective law schools, and only 56 percent of the 
92,648 applicants from the BPS cohort were admitted to any law school (Barnes and 
Carr, 1992; see also Wightman, 1997).  The remaining 44 percent are absent from our 
data.   Figure 2 relates the probability of being admitted to at least one school to the 
admission index percentile, using data on applicants and admissions classified by race, 
LSAT, and UGPA cells (from Barnes and Carr, 1992).  White students whose credentials 
would have placed them in the bottom quarter of the matriculant distribution were more 
likely than not to be rejected from all the schools where they applied.  Conversely, black 
admission rates were above 50 percent in every cell above the fifth percentile and were at 
least double those of similarly-qualified whites through the lower part of the distribution.   
Partly as a result of this gap in admission rates, blacks are dramatically overrepresented 
in the left tail of the index distribution of law school matriculants, and about three 
quarters of black students in the BPS sample are in the bottom quintile. 
A likely explanation for the gap in admission rates is that even the least selective 
schools apply lower thresholds for admission to black than to white applicants.
19  As 
discussed earlier, this will bias black-white comparisons against black students, 
                                                 
19 This contrasts with undergraduate education where, as Kane (1998) notes, only the most 
selective colleges appear to practice affirmative action.  Note that the outcome depicted in Figure 2 is 
endogenous to application decisions – for example, a student who applies only to Yale Law School might 
be admitted nowhere even if she would have been admitted to a less selective school.  This probably 
accounts for the non-trivial rates at which even highly qualified students are admitted nowhere. 
 18  particularly at low index percentiles where the gap in admission probabilities is the 
greatest.  When we restrict our sample to students in the top four quintiles of the 
admission index distribution, in Columns 3-4 of Table 2, the black-white difference in the 
probability of attending a highly selective school nearly doubles.  
Figure 4 presents mean first year class ranks as functions of race, school type, and 
entering credentials.  More qualified students have higher ranks than those with lower 
index scores, and students at less selective schools have higher ranks than similarly-
qualified, same-race students at more selective schools.  Controlling for selectivity, white 
students achieve much higher ranks than blacks.  As the black-white comparison relies on 
the assumption that blacks and whites would achieve similar outcomes if they attended 
the same schools, this result supports our contention that differences in unobserved 
ability or direct race effects bias the black-white comparison in favor of mismatch.  
Table 3 presents regression estimates for class rank.  The first two columns show 
selective-unselective comparisons separately for whites and blacks, again controlling for 
quadratics in (LSAT, UGPA).  Specifications that control for the full set of covariates 
from Table 2, Column 2, are similar.  Attending a highly selective school lowers rank by 
about 0.06 for whites and by twice that for blacks.   Effects on blacks in the top four 
quintiles, shown in Column 4, are even larger. 
Columns 5 and 6 present the black-white comparison for the full sample and for 
students in the top four quintiles.  Because black students attend more selective schools, 
with stronger students, than do white students with the same entering credentials, we 
expect negative black coefficients.  Indeed, black students have ranks about 0.19 lower 
than similarly-qualified whites.  This gap grows to -0.23 in the upper four quintiles.   
 19  VI. Results 
Table 2 indicates large differences in the selectivity of the schools attended by 
black and white students with similar entering credentials.  This difference in selectivity 
occurs across the total sample of students, but is largest in the subsample excluding the 
bottom quintile of the credentials distribution.  Table 3 indicates that each of our 
comparisons exploits substantial differences in the degree to which students are 
mismatched during law school, as measured by rank in class.   
If mismatch lowers post-law school outcomes for marginal students, both the 
selective-unselective and black-white comparisons should show negative effects on these 
outcomes.  Figure 5 repeats the estimates from Figure 4, this time for bar exam passage 
rates.  While Figure 4 indicated large selective-unselective and black-white gaps in class 
rank, no selective-unselective gap is apparent in Figure 5, and the black-white gap is 
relatively small and concentrated at the lowest percentile scores. 
Table 4 reports selective-unselective comparisons for each of our outcomes, with 
controls for a quadratic in (LSAT, UGPA).  For binary outcomes, we show both probit 
coefficients and marginal effects averaged over the treated sample (in square brackets).   
Consistent with Figure 4, the estimates offer no indication of mismatch effects.  
For white students (Columns 1-2), the selectivity effect is positive and significant on four 
of our five outcomes, with an insignificant negative effect for full-time employment.  The 
estimated effects for black students (Columns 3-4) are positive and significant for 
graduation and salaries; all others are statistically insignificant (though the employment 
point estimate is positive and large).  Columns 5 and 6 report p-values for tests of the 
hypotheses that the white and black effects are equal or are both zero.  We (marginally) 
 20  reject equality in only one case, with a large positive effect on bar passage for whites and 
a negligible effect for blacks.  In contrast, we reject zero effects in four of five cases. 
Table 5 presents our black-white comparison.  Considering first the full sample, in 
Columns 1-2, we find that black students have significantly lower graduation and bar 
passage rates than similarly-qualified whites.  Point estimates indicate nearly a ten 
percentage point average effect on bar passage.  Since black students attend more 
selective schools than do whites with the same credentials, these estimates are consistent 
with negative selectivity effects.  By contrast, the black effects on employment outcomes 
are positive and in two cases are large and significant.   
As discussed earlier, comparisons based on students with very poor credentials 
are subject to sample selection bias deriving from the comparatively high rates at which 
white applicants with these credentials are denied admission to any law school.  This bias 
is likely less severe in estimates based on the top four quintiles of the entering credentials 
distribution, where large majorities of both white and black applicants are admitted to at 
least one school.  (Recall from Tables 2 and 3 that affirmative action preferences are just 
as strong and black students are just as likely to be mismatched relative to their 
classmates in this subsample.)  Columns 3-4 of Table 5 show black-white comparisons 
for the subsample of top-quintile students.  All of the point estimates are notably more 
positive than in Column 1.  The only negative coefficient is small and statistically 
insignificant, indicating only a 2.8 percentage point shortfall in black bar passage rates 
relative to similarly-qualified whites. 
We have explored several alternative specifications for both the selective-
unselective and black-white comparisons.  Our results are robust to semiparametric 
 21  controls (implemented via matching techniques) for the LSAT score and undergraduate 
GPA, and to the inclusion of controls for the student characteristics used in Column 2 of 
Table 2.  We also varied the definitions of our dependent variables.  For example, we 
tried coding students who did not attempt the bar exam as failures or successes, rather 
than excluding them as in our main sample; counting part-time workers as employed; and 
excluding students with high-prestige but low-salary jobs (e.g. clerkships) from our 
analyses of salaries.
20  In each case, results were qualitatively unchanged. 
VII.  Conclusion 
The most convincing test of the mismatch hypothesis would require random 
assignment of students to more- and less-selective schools.  Neither this sort of 
experiment nor a convincing natural experiment is available.  Accordingly, research and 
policymaking must proceed from non-experimental analyses that are identified only via 
assumptions about counterfactual outcomes. 
The Bar Passage Study data are well suited for non-experimental analyses.  By 
focusing on two simple reduced-form comparisons, we have shown that the data speak 
clearly about the mismatch hypothesis as it applies to students with credentials in the top 
four quintiles of law school matriculants.  Neither selective-unselective nor black-white 
comparisons offer any evidence for mismatch effects on these students.  As the most 
selective schools admit almost exclusively from this subpopulation, we conclude that the 
use of affirmative action at these schools does not generate meaningful mismatch effects.   
                                                 
20 We explored models treating clerkships as an endogenous source of sample selection, using 
variables measuring students’ preferences across job types as stated during the first year of law school as 
determinants of selection not directly affecting salaries.  This had no effect on the results.  In another 
specification, we modeled taking the bar exam as endogenous.  We were unable to estimate the selection 
coefficient in our model for bar passage with any precision, largely because we lack plausible instruments 
for selection on this margin.  
 22  We similarly find no evidence of mismatch effects on employment outcomes in 
any portion of the distribution.  Black students are much more likely to obtain good jobs 
than are similarly-qualified white students, with a salary premium around 10-15 percent.  
This finding might reflect affirmative action on the part of employers.  A crucial question 
is whether firms’ hiring patterns would change if law schools eliminated affirmative 
action.  If, in its absence, high-salary firms would recruit from less selective schools to 
obtain black lawyers, the observed black salary premium might persist.  Thus, our 
analysis does not definitively indicate that affirmative action in law school admission 
helps black students after law school, as the benefit may derive from affirmative action in 
employment.  It only demonstrates that the combined effect is positive.   
Our analysis of graduation and bar passage outcomes of students with bottom-
quintile credentials yields murkier results.  In this subpopulation, which contains the 
majority of black law students, the black-white comparison is consistent with the 
presence of mismatch effects deriving from the use of affirmative action by mid-ranked 
schools to admit students who would otherwise attend the least selective schools.  But we 
cannot rule out an alternative explanation—namely, that the observed black-white gap 
simply reflects sample selection bias.  Many bottom-quintile applicants are unable to gain 
admission to any law school.  As a consequence of the least selective schools’ use of 
affirmative action, this outcome is much more likely for white than for black applicants. 
If the unobserved qualifications (e.g., personal statement, references, employment 
history) influencing admission decisions are predictive of later outcomes, the resulting 
sample selection could well produce the observed black-white gaps.   
 23  How predictive would the admission variables have to be of later outcomes in 
order to account for the observed data without mismatch?  We estimate that a correlation 
of 0.25 between the unobserved determinants of admission and graduation would fully 
explain the black-white gap observed among bottom-quintile students without recourse to 
mismatch-based explanations.
21  A correlation of this magnitude can by no means be 
rejected out of hand.  Thus, without direct evidence about the selection into law school, 
the data do not permit strong conclusions about the existence of mismatch effects on the 
least qualified students’ graduation and bar passage rates.   
Even granting this limitation, however, it is possible to comment on magnitudes.  
In a companion paper (Rothstein and Yoon, 2008; see also Ayres and Brooks, 2005), we 
show that even if the entire black-white gap were attributed to mismatch – that is, even if 
sample selection were ignored – the implied effects of mismatch on black students’ 
graduation and bar passage probabilities would be dwarfed by the positive effects of 
preferences on the number of black students admitted to law school.  As a consequence, 
the only result consistent with the data is that the net effect of affirmative action is to 
dramatically increase the number of black lawyers.   
                                                 
21 The calculation resembles that used by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005).  We simulated data 
with bivariate normal errors in equations for the latent determinants of selection and graduation, assuming 
no black-white gap in graduation propensity in the population, then imposed the selection rule.  With ρ = 
0.25, the simulated sample selection bias equaled the observed black-white gap in graduation rates.  
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Note:  Figure displays empirical CDFs of the percentile scores--which by construction are uniformly
distributed in the full sample--for whites and blacks separately.
Figure 1.  Distribution of admission index percentile scores
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Figure 2.  Fraction of applicants admitted to at least one school,










































Note:  Fractions are smoothed using a local linear regression smoother (with an Epanechnikov kernel and  
optimal "rule of thumb" bandwidths) applied to the underlying admission index.  90 percent pointwise 
confidence intervals are computed by bootstrap with 500 replications.  Estimates and CIs are censored 
at 0 and 1, and the series are reported only for the range spanned by each race subsample.
Figure 3.  Fraction attending highly selective law schools,


















































Note:  Ranks are smoothed using a local linear regression smoother (with an Epanechnikov kernel and 
optimal "rule of thumb" bandwidths) applied to the underlying admission index.  Estimates are shown 
only for points between the 1st and 99th percentiles of each subpopulation admission index distribution.





























Note:  Rates are smoothed using a local linear regression smoother (with an Epanechnikov kernel and 
optimal "rule of thumb" bandwidths) applied to the underlying admission index.  Estimates are shown 
only for points between the 1st and 99th percentiles of each subpopulation admission index distribution.
Figure 5.  Bar passage rates by race, law school selectivity,
and index percentile
 Table 1.  Summary statistics
Mean S.D. Blacks Whites Sel. Unsel. Sel. Unsel.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
N 1,836 22,213 419 1,417 5,417 16,796
Black 7.6% 0.266 100% 0% 100% 100% 0% 0%
Female 43.7% 0.496 59.5% 42.4% 60.1% 59.3% 43.2% 42.2%
Admissions credentials
LSAT 36.8 5.5 28.8 37.5 32.7 27.6 40.5 36.5
UGPA 3.24 0.42 2.87 3.27 3.04 2.82 3.43 3.21
Admissions index 747 105 583 761 662 559 824 740
Admissions index %ile 51.6 28.4 14.7 54.6 29.3 10.4 72.2 48.9
Law school type
Selective (top 2 clusters) 24% 0.429 23% 24% 100% 0% 100% 0%
Elite (top cluster) 8% 0.271 8% 8% 35% 0% 33% 0%
Outcomes
1st year LGPA 0.06 0.98 -1.01 0.15 -1.15 -0.97 0.17 0.14
1st year class rank (est.) 0.52 0.29 0.23 0.54 0.19 0.24 0.55 0.54
Graduated from law school? 91% 29% 81% 92% 90% 78% 95% 91%
Ever pass bar exam? 81% 39% 57% 83% 69% 53% 86% 82%
Ever pass bar (if attempted)? 86% 35% 61% 88% 75% 57% 93% 87%
Empl. full time (if grad.) 66% 47% 63% 67% 74% 60% 70% 65%
"Good" job (if employed) 40% 49% 44% 40% 53% 40% 58% 34%
Salary (if FT; $1,000s) $39.8 $18.8 $38.0 $40.0 $47.3 $34.5 $49.1 $36.8




By race and selectivity Full sampleTable 2.  Black-white differences in selectivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.858 0.888 1.050 1.064
(0.045) (0.046) (0.063) (0.064)
LSAT -0.175 -0.160 -0.631 -0.608
(0.021) (0.021) (0.051) (0.051)
(LSAT/100)
2 16.014 14.466 51.051 48.378
(2.607) (2.635) (5.167) (5.207)
UGPA -0.387 -0.469 -3.061 -3.204
(0.322) (0.325) (0.517) (0.520)
(UGPA/10)
2 -11.618 -8.719 -3.082 0.926
(4.943) (4.989) (6.034) (6.081)
LSAT * UGPA 0.048 0.046 0.100 0.099
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Additional controls ny ny
Average effect of "black" on 
probability 0.162 0.164 0.350 0.348
Black
Full sample
Notes:  The dependent variable is an indicator for attending a school in the "elite" and 
"public ivy" clusters.  N=24,049 in full sample (Cols. 1-2), 19,806 in subsample (Cols. 3-4).  
The table reports probit coefficients and standard errors.  The final row shows the 
increment in the probability of attending a highly selective school associated with being 
black, averaged over the black students in the sample.  Additional controls in Columns 2 
and 4 are gender; age (in months) at law school entry and its square; mother's and father's 
education (plus indicators for missing values); and indicators for disability/handicap, for 
speaking English as a second language, for taking more than one year off after college, for 
working full-time for 2 or more years, for legal work experience, for working for pay as an 
undergraduate, for a father with a white-collar occupation, and for a mother employed 
outside the home.  
Top 4 quintilesWhites Blacks Whites Blacks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Selective -0.060 -0.116 -0.060 -0.211
(0.005) (0.015) (0.005) (0.026)
Black -0.189 -0.226
(0.008) (0.013)
LSAT 0.033 -0.015 0.023 0.005 0.019 0.039
(0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.089) (0.004) (0.009)
(LSAT/100)
2 -1.435 2.963 0.429 -3.628 -0.207 -1.006
(0.600) (1.198) (0.997) (8.310) (0.458) (0.979)
UGPA -0.193 -0.318 -0.170 -1.273 -0.244 -0.115
(0.064) (0.161) (0.098) (0.794) (0.055) (0.096)
(UGPA/10)
2 6.269 4.940 6.835 15.533 6.379 6.888
(0.916) (2.568) (1.124) (7.410) (0.854) (1.106)
LSAT * UGPA -0.003 0.003 -0.004 0.012 -0.002 -0.006
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001)
N 20,485 1,698 17,854 412 22,183 18,266
Note:  Table reports coefficients from OLS regressions.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3.  Selective-unselective and black-white comparisons for first year class rank
Selective-unselective comparison Black-white comparison
Full sample Top 4 quintiles Full 
sample
Top 4 
quintilesN N Both equal Both zero
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Law school graduation 0.235 22,081 0.233 1,809 0.987 0.000
(0.035) (0.102)
[0.028] [0.045]




Has a full-time job -0.111 2,306 0.154 838 0.261 0.172
(0.071) (0.121)
[-0.035] [0.050]
"Good" job, if FT employe 0.278 1,532 0.050 537 0.409 0.001
(0.085) (0.140)
[0.103] [0.018]
Ln(salary), if FT employed 0.153 1,501 0.227 528 0.442 0.000
(0.030) (0.053)
Notes:  Reported coefficients are for a selective school indicator in OLS (ln(salary)) and probit (other 
outcomes) specifications.  Each specification controls for a quadratic in (LSAT, UGPA).  Analyses of 
employment outcomes use sampling weights.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Bold coefficients are 
significant at the 5% level.  Marginal effects, in square brackets, are the change in probability due to 
attending a selective school, averaged over all selective=1 observations.  Tests of equal/zero 
coefficients are computed from pooled, fully interacted specifications.  
Table 4.  Selective-unselective comparisons for post-law school outcomes
Whites Blacks p values for hypothesis testsNN
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Law school graduation -0.144 23,890 0.031 19,699
(0.046) (0.089)
[-0.036] [0.005]




Has a full-time job 0.130 3,144 0.408 2,294
(0.105) (0.189)
[0.049] [0.143]
"Good" job, if employed 0.576 2,069 0.759 1,555
(0.129) (0.202)
[0.201] [0.287]
Ln(salary), if FT employed 0.100 2,029 0.157 1,525
(0.045) (0.071)
Table 5.  Black-white comparisons
Notes:  Reported coefficients are for the black indicator in probit & OLS specifications.  All 
specifications include controls for a quadratic in (LSAT, UGPA).  Analyses of employment 
outcomes use sampling weights.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Bold coefficients are 
significant at the 5% level.  Marginal effects, in square brackets, are the change in probability 
from black=0 to black=1, averaged over all black=1 observations.  
Full sample Top four quintiles